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We propose a quantum key distribution scheme which closely matches the performance of a
perfect single photon source. It nearly attains the physical upper bound in terms of key genera-
tion rate and maximally achievable distance. Our scheme relies on a practical setup based on a
parametric downconversion source and present-day, non-ideal photon-number detection. Arbitrary
experimental imperfections which lead to bit errors are included. We select decoy states by classical
post-processing. This allows to improve the effective signal statistics and achievable distance.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties
(Alice and Bob) to communicate securely even in the
presence of an arbitrarily powerful eavesdropper (Eve)
who tries to listen undetected. To prove unconditional
security, Eve must not be restricted by any technologi-
cal limitations, but must only be bounded by the laws
of quantum physics. A multitude of protocols has been
suggested in the last decades; BB84 [1] is the best-known
and usually best-performing protocol. It was shown to
be secure both in principle, [2] and references therein,
and in the presence of experimental imperfections, e.g.,
[3]. Unfortunately, the maximal distance and the bit
rates over which secure communications can be guaran-
teed are strongly constricted if experimental imperfec-
tions are taken into account: lossy channels, imperfect
detectors with finite efficiency, dark counts and misalign-
ment errors, as well as non-ideal signal sources – which
do not provide the required single photon states [4, 5]
– degrade the performance of the protocol. Decoy-state
QKD, which was recently introduced by [6], analyzed in
[7, 8] and adapted for practical use in [9, 10], could mend
this. Still, coherent state implementations achieve only
about 70% of the maximal secure distance imposed by
fundamental physics.
In this paper, we show how we can close the gap
between practical QKD implemented with state-of-the-
art devices and idealized QKD assuming perfect single-
photon signals. In our approach, a parametric downcon-
version (PDC) source [11] in conjunction with a photon
number resolving detector [12] – as depicted in Fig. 1 – is
utilized to implement a passive decoy-state QKD scheme.
It does not require any active intensity modulation, but
allows to improve the effectively sent signal statistics by
employing conjugate PDC modes. Strict photon-number
correlations between the two PDC outputs allow to infer
the complete statistical information about one of them by
measuring the photon number distribution of the other.
Passive data analysis enables us to generate optimized
effective signal statistics without physical blocking. For
all practical purposes, our protocol accomplishes up to
few percent the power of a single photon source in terms
of distance, while the key generation rate is on par with
the best available schemes.
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FIG. 1: Setup of the proposed QKD scheme. The PDC source
emits photon-number correlated bipartite states; the TMD
records photon statistics.
Since our work is based on the decoy state method,
we begin by briefly reviewing the basic idea. The se-
curity of BB84 relies on single photons, so signals with
more than one photon are insecure because Eve can per-
form a photon-number splitting (PNS) attack, which has
been shown to be optimal [13]. For this, Eve performs
a quantum non-demolition measurement of the photon
number, taps one photon and delays the measurement
until Alice and Bob announce the bases. If Eve replaces
the lossy channel with a perfect one and passes on the
same statistics as in the lossy channel, this attack can not
be detected in a standard BB84 scheme. The probabil-
ity that at least one photon of an n-photon signal passes
a quantum channel with transmission η = exp(α/10 · l)
(where α is the loss in dB/km and l is the channel length
in km) is given by ηn = 1−(1−η)n, different loss charac-
teristics arise for signals with different photon numbers.
The core idea of the decoy method is to check that the
signal losses behave as expected for different photon num-
bers to exclude PNS attacks. For this, it is necessary to
intersperse the signal stream with decoy states whose in-
tensity differs slightly from the signal states, but share
all other characteristics like wavelength and timing. A
more detailed description can be found in the work of Lo
and coworkers [7].
The security analysis in [7] proofs that a lower bound
on the secure key generation rate is given by
S′ = q{−Qχf(Eχ)H2(Eχ) +Q1 · (1−H2(e1))},
S ≥ S′ ·Θ(S′). (1)
2In Eqn 1 the gain Qχ denotes the ratio of Bob’s detec-
tion events to Alice’s number of submitted signals after
sifting; the yield Yn is defined as the probability that
Bob receives a signal conditioned on that Alice has sent
an n-photon signal. The parameters Eχ and en describe
the overall, and the photon number resolved quantum
bit error rate (QBER), i.e., the fraction of signals which
contribute false key bits although a signal was received.
The quantities are related as follows:
Qχ ≡
∞∑
n=0
Qn =
∞∑
n=0
Ynp(n), (2)
EχQχ ≡
∞∑
n=0
Ynp(n)en. (3)
The function f(x) in Eqn. 1 accounts for non-ideal prac-
tical error correction which does not reach the Shannon
limit, and H2(x) is the binary Shannon entropy. The
sifting factor q corrects incompatible bases, i.e., for stan-
dard BB84 q = 1/2. In the asymptotic limit it is possible
to reach values of q ≈ 1 [5], this is used in the remainder
of the paper. Conventional QKD schemes employ binary
detectors. Thus, only the overall gain Qχ and QBER
Eχ can be measured during transmission. Source char-
acterization guarantees that p(n) is known. The decoy
state idea exploits that the linear system of Equations
(2) and (3) can be solved for Yn and en, if states with
different mean intensities are employed. While Yn and en
are identical in Eve’s absence for the signal and all decoy
states, it is proven that any PNS attack will modify these
quantities, i.e., Eve’s attempt of an PNS attack will be
detected[7].
The original security proof for BB84 given in [14] uti-
lized local operations and one-way classical communi-
cation (1-LOCC). While many security analyses retain
with 1-LOCC, enhanced security proofs employing 2-
LOCC [2] have been elaborated recently and adapted to
the decoy method in [15]. Two-way postprocessing is
performed by comparing parities for random bit pairs in
Alice’s and Bob’s key. If the parities match, they keep
the first bit, otherwise they discard both. One round of
this procedure is called a B-step; repeating it for several
rounds is possible and allows to increase the maximal se-
cure distance. For comparison we consider both cases,
1-LOCC and 2-LOCC.
Consider the setup in Fig. 1. In the source, we use
a standard PDC process to obtain the photon-number
correlated state
|ψ〉 =
1
N
∞∑
n=0
λn|n, n〉, (4)
where λ and the normalization factor N depend on the
physical boundary conditions [16]. The distribution ex-
hibits Poissonian (λn =
λn√
n!
, N = e−λ
2
[26]) or thermal
(λn = tanh
2n χ, N = cosh2 χ) statistics in the extremal
cases, so we will consider both possibilities. Since Eve
has no phase reference, the phase is assumed to be totally
randomized, and an effective mixture of photon number
eigenstates with density operator ̺ =
∑
n |λn/N |
2̺n is
transmitted.
Information encoding can be accomplished by polar-
ization or time coding, but the exact method is of no
relevance for the further analysis. A time multiplexed
detector (TMD) provides photon number resolution ca-
pabilities. There are several methods to perform photon
number resolution, but we focus on TMD detection [12]
since it is cost-effective and easy to handle experimen-
tally. The measured TMD statistics can be related to
the impinging photon number statistics by
~psource = L
−1 ·C−1 · ~pmeas ≡ R(~pmeas) (5)
where the loss matrix L accounts for photon loss in the
detection, and the convolution matrixCmodels the effect
of a finite number of detected modes in the TMD design
(for details: see [12]); ~ps and ~pm describe the original
photon number distribution of the source and the mea-
sured statistics. The quantity C · L can be determined
by measurement, but there is also an analytical repre-
sentation pη(m|n) for the matrix entries given in [17]. It
represents the probability to get an m-photon detection
outcome conditioned on n photons entering the detector
with total loss η. Using Eqn. 5, the TMD measurement
can be inverted so that the real statistics of the source are
reconstructed with high fidelity[18]. Note that this inver-
sion is only possible for an ensemble of states, but not for
a single signal, so Alice needs to record the measurement
results of the TMD for every time slot. After this, Al-
ice and Bob follow the standard protocol of BB84 [4] for
information encoding and analysis.
The essential step of passive decoy state selection fol-
lows after a sufficiently large number of signals (say,
Ntot ≫ 1) has been transmitted; note that Alice will run
the source with constant pump intensity and without any
active optical manipulations for the duration of the pro-
cedure. Fig. 2 provides an overview about the process:
The measured discrete probability distribution ~pmeas is
calculated by pmeas(n) =
#ntot
Ntot
, where #ntot denotes
the number of n-photon measurement outcomes from the
TMD. This distribution can be inverted by Eqn. 5; the
strict photon number correlations of the PDC states en-
sure that Alice’s measurement coincide with the signal
statistics.
Assume that we start with a random selection of a set
containing M ≪ Ntot signals to construct decoy states,
which have exactly the same statistics as the remaining
signal states. Alice then additionally picks δn slots with
an n-photon measurement result such that
#ndecoy = #ntot ·
M
Ntot
+ δn (6)
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Classical decoy state selection. Apt
subsets of the recorded TMD measurements are selected and
inverted to form the decoy states which are similar to the
signal state. The photon number distributions are not drawn
to scale for instructive purposes.
where δn is a small positive or negative offset which re-
sults in a photon number distribution of the decoy subset
differing slightly from the distribution in the signal. The
decoy subset can be inverted to obtain the proper proba-
bility distribution ~pdecoy. Depending on how many decoy
states are to be used (one vacuum state and two decoy
states similar to the signal are sufficient, cf. [9, 19]), an
appropriate number of subsets has to be chosen. Differ-
ent distributions of δn for different subsets ensure that
the generated decoy signals are sufficiently distinct from
each other as required to solve the system of linear equa-
tions (2,3). We would like to stress that our passive
method for “generating” decoys provides distinct advan-
tages: during signal transmission it is still undecided
which states will become signal or decoy states. This im-
plies that a distinction between signal and decoy states
by Eve is not possible, even in principle. It is also impor-
tant to emphasize that our decoy selection mechanism
eliminates many experimental challenges (e.g., different
spectra of the generated PDC light for signal and decoys
which gives Eve a chance to experimentally distinguish
between them) which arise in proposals with the same
hardware, but a different analysis procedure ([20, 21]),
which do not draw maximal use of the TMD’s capabil-
ities. The remainder of the protocol is identical to a
standard decoy scheme: Alice and Bob check en and Yn
as described above. Error correction and privacy ampli-
fication need to be performed to generate a final secure
key. The inset in Fig. 3 presents our simulation results
(for details see below). The key generation rate and max-
imal secure distance closely match a perfect single photon
source.
The TMD results can not only be used to generate
decoy states, but also provide improved effective sig-
nal statistics. While the error rates en for n ≥ 1 are
the order of 10−2, the contribution by vacuum signals is
e0 = 1/2 [27]. Thus, it is desirable to remove such events
as good as possible. Decreasing the dark count rate on
Bob’s side is hard because it requires refinement of the
detectors, while fine-grained time triggering can be used
on Alice’s side to reduce the dark count probability in the
TMD to a negligible level, i.e., p(n|m) = 0 for n > m [12].
Note that due to losses and imperfect detection, filtering
multi-photon contributions does not work perfectly and
results in comparatively small rate improvements ([20]).
The benefits are negligible in contrast to filtering zero
photon contributions. Alice has recorded the TMD mea-
surement for every signal. Hence she can easily discard
all zero events in the postprocessing phase which leads
to a better effective probability distribution given by
pf,meas(n) =
{
0 n = 0
1
Ntot−
∑
∞
n=1
#n
· #n
Ntot
n ≥ 0
, (7)
where pf,meas denotes the measured, filtered distribution;
the effectively sent distribution is ~p = R(~pf,meas). Since
p(0|n) 6= 0 for n > 0, some usable signal states are also
removed from the distribution, but this does not endan-
ger the total positive effect of the filtering. To implement
the operation, Alice and Bob need to discard all slots in
the postprocessing stage where the TMD result was zero
and use the inverted probability distribution in the rate
calculations.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Simulation results for two-way and
one-way (inset) classical communication. Both graphs were
obtained by a numerical evaluation of Eqn. 1; the optimal
values for χ and the number of B-Steps which maximize the
key generation rate have been used for all distances. The
right border represents the principal upper bound given by
the intercept-resend attack.
Note that filtering of this type does not reduce the sig-
nal rate: A subset of the signal set is removed during
postprocessing because this subset will make the over-
all result only worse. No physical blocking of signals is
performed. This leaves the transmitted signals unmod-
ified. Fig. 3 and Tab. I present the results of the nu-
merical evaluation for all cases discussed above: Signals
with and without filtering for both 1- and 2-LOCC. Note
that we apply an optimization for both, the best value
for χ and the ideal number of B-Steps for every distance.
To allow comparison with other proposals, we use the
set of experimental parameters given in [22]. The upper
4bound on the secure distance caused by the undetectable
intercept-resend attack at a QBER of more than 25% [5]
lies at 208km, i.e., the right border of the graph. The
lower bound on our rate closely approaches this upper
limit, and reaches the single photon performance. One
also needs to keep in mind that this upper bound is not
even tight, but can be replaced by smaller ones (e.g.,
[23]).
The filtering transformation in Eqn. 7 modifies the
effective signal distribution so that a different rate is
obtained although the sent statistics remain unmodi-
fied. Thus, a penalty factor needs to be introduced into
Eqn. 1 when an optimal χ is sought to maximize S:
S ≥ ppen · S′ ·Θ(S′), ppen = 1−
∑∞
n=0 p(0|n)ps(n). The
optimal values for χ depend on the simulation parameters
and the source statistics; a comprehensive set of results
for different combinations can be found in [24]. Here it
suffices to know that the range for χ is (0, 0.5) which
can well be realized with current PDC sources [25]. Ex-
isting sources provide better performance than actually
required.
Source
distance
unf./filt. ∆1,f ∆2,f
Thermal (1-way) 130.8/169.7 0.7% 18.3%
Thermal (2-way) 174.5/194.5 0.4% 6.3%
Poissonian (1-way) 141.2/166.0 2.9% 20.0%
Poissonian (2-way) 180.8/193.8 0.7% 6.6%
TABLE I: Comparison of the obtainable distances for differ-
ent signal sources and postprocessing methods with the limits
set by a perfect single photon source and the principal phys-
ical upper bound. A perfect single photon source achieves
170.9km for 1-LOCC and 195.2km for 2-LOCC. ∆1,f denotes
the difference to this distance. ∆2,f denotes the the difference
to the principal intercept-resend upper bound. Both refer to
the effectively filtered source. At most 4 B-Steps were used.
As explained above, two-way processing with B-steps
can increase the achievable distances. Ma et al. [15] cal-
culated that after performing a B-Step, a lower bound
on the secure key generation rate is given by S′ =
qQχ
(
1
2
sn6=1
(
−f(E′χ)H2(E
′
χ) + Ω
′(1 −H2(e′1,p))
))
, S ≥
S′ ·Θ(S′). A detailled derivation of the formula is beyond
the scope of this paper, but can be found in Refs. [15, 24].
Multiple rounds of B-Steps apply the transformation
multiple times). The difference between the lower bound
on the maximal secure distance and the principal limit
shrinks to about 6.5% with 4 B-Steps as shown in Tab. I.
In summary, we have shown how to use the photon
number correlations of a PDC source to implement a
BB84 scheme which nearly reaches the performance of a
single photon scheme. This removes the predominant im-
perfection from real-world QKD implementations. Since
the lower bound on the key generation rate coincides up
to a few percent with the principal upper bounds, fur-
ther improvements need either come from new protocols
or improved hardware. Refinements of security proofs
will likely be unfruitful by comparison.
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